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Introduction
It is a constant source of amusement, 
surprise and frustration to me — as I 
am sure it is for many practitioners and 
their clients — as to why governments 
in Australia cannot seem to leave the 
taxation arrangements which apply to 
superannuation alone for any period of time.
In the course of writing this article, I had 
occasion to examine various chronologies 
of superannuation and retirement incomes 
in Australia and I was astounded at the 
number of changes that have occurred 
to the superannuation rules in Australia.1 
If one were to print a chronology — and 
then limited it only to changes that have 
occurred since 1983 when lump sum 
taxes were introduced — it would run to 
several pages and, while these changes 
are too numerous to detail here, some of 
the “highlights” include the introduction of 
lump sum taxes in 1983, the imposition of 
a 15% tax on superannuation contributions 
by employers and on superannuation 
earnings in 1988 through to my favourite 
— the so-called “Simpler Super” reforms 
of 2006, which some would regard as 
an oxymoron! These reforms included 
exemption from tax on end benefits for 
Australians aged 60 or over and the 
abolition of reasonable benefit limits 
accompanied by the introduction of 
superannuation contribution caps or limits.
The contribution caps have proved to be 
a sting in the tail of the Simpler Super 
reforms because a person who has 
concessional contributions in excess of 
the annual cap amount is liable to pay 
“excess contributions tax”,2 with the effect 
that the excessive amounts are subject to 
total tax of 46.5% (15% + 31.5% excess 
contributions tax). More people are likely 
to be subject to excess contributions tax 
given that, in recent times, there has been 
a large reduction in the concessional 
superannuation contributions caps, down 
from $50,000 (and as much as $100,000)  
to only $25,000 from 1 July 2012.3
In February 2013, consulting group Mercer 
released a report (the Mercer report) which 
compared Australia’s superannuation tax 
rules with those applicable to retirement 
savings in eight other countries with 
world-class retirement savings.4 The report 
concluded that the current Australian 
contribution caps fall significantly short of 
all other countries included in the report’s 
comparison and this issue will be explored 
further below.
In the lead up to 2013 federal election 
which is to be held on 14 September 
2013, rumours of further changes to 
superannuation are gathering momentum 
ahead of the federal Budget in May 2013. It 
is therefore timely to examine some of the 
policy considerations of why such changes 
may be considered by the government. 
This article argues against any further 
changes being made to the superannuation 
rules and will present reasons which 
support this position.
Policy context
Since Federation, superannuation has been 
an important theme for the Commonwealth 
Government and this importance has 
intensified with the ageing population in 
Australia and the expected slowing in the 
growth of the workforce in Australia that 
flows from an ageing population.
In common with many other countries, 
the retirement income system in Australia 
consists of three pillars:
(1) the age pension which is provided by 
the Commonwealth Government;
(2) compulsory superannuation 
contributions under the superannuation 
guarantee regime;5 and
(3) additional savings via voluntary 
superannuation contributions.
Consistent with these three pillars, 
superannuation has always been a 
preferentially taxed savings vehicle in order 
to encourage Australian taxpayers to invest 
in and save for their own future retirement. 
This in turn is designed to reduce the 
burden on the government to provide 
pensions for taxpayers when they retire.
Put another way, superannuation involves 
a trade-off. Taxpayers are encouraged 
and induced to put away their savings until 
retirement and forgo consumption today in 
return for concessional tax treatment. The 
benefit for the government is the financial 
independence of taxpayers once they retire 
and consequently the lower the demand on 
the government-funded age pension system.
It is important to appreciate this trade-off 
and to understand the delicate policy context 
in which superannuation exists as it is easy 
for this balance to become disrupted which 
can result in detrimental consequences for 
both retirees and the government.
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Funds held in superannuation
Over the years, superannuation has 
become an increasingly important part of 
household wealth. As at December 2012, 
the total estimated superannuation assets 
under management is a staggering $1.51t 
(up from $1.31t in December 2011)6 — that 
is about the same as Australia’s annual 
gross domestic product.
According to figures released by the 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA),6 self-managed superannuation 
funds (SMSFs) held the largest proportion of 
superannuation assets, accounting for 31.5% 
of assets, followed by retail funds with 26.4% 
of total assets. Industry funds accounted for 
19.5% of total assets, public sector funds 
15.7% and corporate funds 3.8%. Small 
APRA funds held 0.1% of total assets.
The fiscal context 
With the government now well underway 
with its 2013 Budget preparations, some 
of the initiatives with large funding costs 
that need to be factored in as part of this 
process include the National Disability and 
Insurance Scheme (NDIS), with estimates 
ranging from $15b gross to $22b gross,7 
the National Broadband Network (NBN) 
which was initially estimated to cost 
$36.9b to construct over a 10-year period 
(including a federal government investment 
of $27.5b),8 and the Gonski education 
reforms with an estimated cost of $6.5b.9 
Just considering these three announced 
initiatives gives some context to the 
magnitude of “structural savings” that the 
government will need to achieve if it is to 
successfully fund and implement these 
measures. Apart from significant capital 
obligations, they of course also carry large 
recurrent funding obligations.
Against the background of the high cost of 
these initiatives, the government is facing 
a shortage in tax revenues in many areas. 
The much publicised case of the minerals 
resource rent tax — where the government 
recently announced it has only collected 
$126m against a revenue forecast of  
$2b — is a case in point.
The Treasurer conceded in an economic 
note released on 24 February 2013 that 
at the centre of the challenges that the 
government faces in this year’s Budget is 
the huge hit to government revenues that 
has occurred since the global financial 
crisis.10 Tax-to-GDP has dropped from 
around 24% before the global financial 
crisis to around 20%, and further 
massive write-downs in revenues have 
been brought about by dramatic falls in 
commodity prices in the second half of 
2012, together with the high Australian 
dollar.10 With revenues coming in lower 
than expected, this partly explains why the 
Budget will not return to surplus in 2012-13 
and, in this context, many have questioned 
whether the government should be 
pursuing high-cost spending measures like 
the NBN, the NDIS and the Gonski reforms 
which will need to be funded in a very tight 
fiscal environment.
Cash cow ripe for the picking? 
Given the substantial amount of money 
tied up in superannuation, it is perhaps 
no surprise that governments could be 
tempted to cast their eyes on it and view it 
as a ready source of revenue to either fund 
its initiatives or to use it as a cash cow to 
address its growing Budget shortfalls.
When considering possible areas where 
the government may focus on increasing 
its tax revenues, one needs to consider the 
current taxing points for superannuation 
in Australia. Broadly, taxation of 
superannuation can occur at three points:
(1) when contributions are made to a 
superannuation fund;
(2) on the investment earnings of a 
superannuation fund; and
(3) on end benefits (for example, lump 
sums on retirement)
Since 2007, when the Simpler Super 
reforms were introduced, Australia has 
operated on what is commonly known as 
a “TTE” basis (where T denotes a taxed 
superannuation point and E denotes a 
tax-exempt superannuation point) under 
which taxes are applied on assessable 
contributions (which include those made 
by an employer on behalf of an employee 
and personal contributions for which the 
contributor is entitled to a deduction) and 
investment earnings but end benefits are 
exempt for those aged 60 and above.
By contrast, many countries (including 
Canada, Chile, the Netherlands, the UK 
and the US) have adopted an EET system, 
where contributions and investment 
earnings are exempt from tax, while 
benefits are normally subject to full 
taxation, when received.11 Many fear that 
the Australian government could remove 
the exemption for end benefits in the 
forthcoming May 2013 federal Budget, but 
under growing political and community 
pressure, in February 2013, the Prime 
Minister ruled out taxing withdrawals from 
superannuation for people aged 60 and 
over.
While the Prime Minister ruled this out, the 
government might now consider changes 
to the 15% concessional tax rate on 
assessable superannuation contributions 
and the 15% tax on investment earnings 
which some in the government believe 
favours the wealthy. Indeed, increasing 
these taxes would be the easiest expedient 
for the government, especially given 
that the bulk of what would be taxed is 
already there (“a sitting duck”). In terms 
of future contributions, these are largely 
compulsory and are now rising to 12% of 
earnings, which would give the government 
a “double whammy” if it increased taxes 
on contributions as well, that is, a higher 
tax rate to apply on contributions which are 
planned to rise from 9% to 12%.
Another area that the government could 
focus on is particular segments and 
aspects of the superannuation system, 
including SMSFs and capital gains tax 
concessions, for example. As noted 
earlier, given that SMSFs held the largest 
proportion of superannuation assets 
(accounting for 31.5% of assets as at 
December 2012), this represents a sizable 
potential target for the government to 
seek to tax more heavily. One area that 
has received attention in relation to 
SMSFs is their use of CGT exemptions. 
Critics of SMSFs believe that they use 
these exemptions more aggressively than 
other superannuation funds, given that 
they usually have one or two members 
who can quickly buy and sell investment 
properties, whereas bigger funds hold 
large portfolios which are typically held 
over longer terms with the benefits shared 
among many members.12 When considering 
the government’s appetite for changes 
in this area, it must be remembered that 
Treasury commenced examining options 
to scale back tax concessions for SMSFs 
during the second half of 2012, but the 
government did not proceed with these 
cuts in the mid-year economic and fiscal 
outlook in October 2012.12
A final area that the government might 
continue to target is the contribution caps. 
As noted in the introduction to this article, 
the cap in Australia from 1 July 2012 has 
already been reduced to $25,000, which 
is down from $50,000 and as much as 
$100,000 previously. This downward trend, 
I would argue, represents bad policy. The 
Mercer report concludes that the current 
Australian arrangements, in respect of 
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contributions caps, clearly falls short on an 
international basis.13 The report found that 
the existing cap of AU$25,000 per annum is 
the lowest of any country (when expressed 
as a percentage of average earnings) 
and, in most cases, the difference is 
considerable, for example, the contribution 
cap in the UK is GB£40,000 and in the US 
it is US$51,000.14
Many commentators have noted that the 
imposition of a $25,000 per annum cap 
on contributions to superannuation will 
have the effect of preventing many people 
(for example, parents in their late 50s and 
60s who have a better capacity to save 
once their children have left home) from 
accumulating enough superannuation to 
sustain them through what could be  
30 or more years in retirement (given  
rising life expectancies).15 This in turn  
could put greater pressure on the 
government-provided age pension, 
as many would not have been able to 
adequately provide for their own retirement.
My view is that a limit of at least $50,000 
(which is indexed) should be reintroduced 
as this is well within the reach of many 
Australians and will allow Australians the 
opportunity of accumulating funds for their 
own retirement (which will reduce their 
dependency on the age pension when  
they retire).
The tax expenditures argument
A “tax expenditure” is a provision of 
the tax law that provides a benefit to a 
specified activity or class of taxpayer that 
is concessional when compared to the 
“standard” tax treatment that would apply.16 
Tax expenditures can include tax exemptions, 
tax deductions, tax offsets, concessional tax 
rates or deferrals of tax liability.
The Tax expenditures statement 2012 
(TES 2012) shows that the largest 
tax expenditures in 2011-12 were for 
superannuation (which amounts to 
around 25% of all tax expenditures) and 
owner-occupied housing, followed by tax 
concessions relating to the GST.17 The 
TES 2012 estimates that expenditures 
relating to superannuation will rise from 
just under $32b in 2012-13 to just under 
$45b by 2015-16. The largest measured tax 
expenditure is the concessional taxation of 
superannuation entity earnings of around 
$17.1b in 2012-13 and the concessional 
taxation of employer contributions to 
superannuation amounts to approximately 
$13.2b in 2012-13. Interestingly, deductions 
for superannuation contributions and the 
concessional taxation of certain personal 
contributions only amount to a mere $1.05b 
in 2012-13. 
These are big numbers in anyone’s 
language and it is therefore no surprise 
that it has received attention from the 
government which might take the view that 
this rising trend in revenue foregone should 
mean that superannuation should be taxed 
more than it currently is. In other words, it 
may be contended by the government that 
the current superannuation system is too 
generous.
I do not subscribe to this view and, although 
some might argue that superannuation tax 
concessions are a big cost to government, 
this does not take account of the benefits 
and future financial savings for the 
government as a result of people being 
more self-sufficient in their retirement and 
not depending on the age pension.
The opposite view is also supported 
by many commentators. Stammer, 
for example, contends that Treasury’s 
calculations made inadequate allowance 
for the front-ended taxation of 
superannuation (for example, by ignoring 
many contributions that are now taxed 
at 30%); rather, he contends that they 
assume the $1.5t of assets currently 
held in superannuation funds would be 
invested elsewhere with all earnings taxed 
at marginal rates, not to mention that they 
ignore future tax collections (for example, 
when someone dies and the taxable 
component of their superannuation benefit 
is not paid to a dependent spouse or minor 
child, then tax at 16.5% applies).15
For someone who is paying 46.5c in the 
dollar in income tax at the margin, Treasury 
calculates that the person is receiving a tax 
concession of 31.5% (assuming a 15% rate 
on contributions for those earning less than 
$300,000 a year) on their superannuation 
contributions. Many economists, including 
Henry Ergas, argue that this should not be 
regarded as a “concession” because taxing 
superannuation as ordinary income would 
yield ludicrously high effective tax rates 
on retirement savings.18 Ergas uses the 
following example to illustrate his point:18
“Consider a taxpayer facing a 46.5 per cent 
marginal tax rate.Assuming a nominal return of 
8 per cent and a real return of 5 per cent due to 
3 per cent inflation, taxing that income earner’s 
superannuation as ordinary income would imply 
an effective tax rate of about 70 per cent, in part 
because taxes would remove income that was 
simply compensation for inflation.
Indeed, for super held for 40 years, the effective 
tax rate would be 95 per cent, meaning that each 
dollar saved would fund 5c in future consumption. 
In other words, to pay for $1 in retirement 
consumption, a young person today would need 
to save $20, with 19 of those 20 dollars being 
removed as tax.”
This is clearly an inequitable and inefficient 
outcome which would likely encourage 
people to divert their voluntary contributions 
into other assets, including the tax-sheltered 
family home, or turn to investments in 
negatively geared property and shares 
which is costly to government revenue.
Ergas goes on to note that, in relation to 
compulsory superannuation contributions, 
imposing higher rates would be equivalent 
to increasing the income tax, as the 
superannuation payment that has to be 
made on each dollar earned attracts 
penal levels of taxation.18 This would have 
detrimental impacts on the labour market, 
including discouraging and reducing 
labour market participation and decreasing 
output. In turn, instead of rising, the tax 
take could paradoxically reduce.
Finally on this point, the Mercer report 
found that the current tax concessions 
on superannuation in Australia are not 
generous when compared to the retirement 
systems in eight other countries (Canada, 
Chile, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the UK and the US) which are 
considered to have world-class retirement 
systems.19
The research undertaken by Mercer 
modelled the effect of different tax 
systems, showing the present value of 
the after-tax retirement benefit for an 
individual on average earnings, with a 9% 
employer contribution over 40 years, and 
benchmarked these results against the 
Australian superannuation system. This 
analysis revealed that the net retirement 
benefits in Australia are lower than five of 
the eight countries that were part of the 
research. For example, an average British 
worker would be 16.4% or $43,534 higher, 
while an American worker would be 11% 
or $29,273 higher than their Australian 
counterpart. Only Denmark and Sweden 
had lower benefits, but OECD figures reveal 
that, in both of these countries, public 
expenditure on old-age taxpayers is higher 
than in Australia because of a universal 
pension in Denmark and an earning-related 
scheme in Sweden.20
The above analysis led Mercer to the 
conclusion that “on the global stage, the 
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taxation of Australia’s retirement savings is 
not overly generous” (emphasis added).21
Conclusion
This article has examined some of the 
areas in the superannuation system that 
the government might target to increase 
its revenues in the lead up to the federal 
election in September 2013. Against 
the background of possible areas the 
government might target, it is somewhat 
ironic that taxes on superannuation are 
already budgeted to be one of the fastest 
growing revenue sources over the coming 
years. Prominent economists, including 
Henry Ergas, have observed in this regard 
that “the 2012-13 budget already list taxes 
on super as the government’s fastest 
growing revenue source over the next three 
years”.21 According to the 2012 Budget 
papers, receipts from superannuation funds 
are budgeted to increase by 11.9% ($960m) 
in 2013-14, 19.9% ($1.8b) in 2014-15, and 
17.7% ($1.9b) in 2015-16.22 The acceleration 
in growth in superannuation tax over these 
years reflects stronger capital gains growth 
as asset markets recover, the effect of crisis-
related losses on tax positions unwinds, 
the phased increase in the superannuation 
guarantee charge to 12%, and the measure 
which was announced in the 2012-13 
Budget to reduce the tax concession which 
very high income earners receive on their 
concessional contributions.22
As noted earlier in this article, Australia’s 
three pillar system of retirement income 
includes the age pension, the compulsory 
superannuation guarantee system and 
voluntary superannuation contributions. 
Reducing future superannuation benefits 
through higher taxation or reduced 
concessions will simply mean a greater 
reliance on the age pension when 
people get to retirement age, which will 
be a detrimental outcome for Australia, 
especially given the ageing of its 
population.
Similarly, the recent reductions in 
contributions caps in Australia to $25,000 
will affect the confidence of people in 
superannuation as a long-term investment 
and creates uncertainty and confusion. As 
Anderson has observed:23
“In June 2008, 34% of working Australians 
considered super to be tax effective.By June 2010, 
this had dropped to 20% and is likely to be even 
lower now.One in five weren’t even sure about the 
tax effectiveness.”
The reduction in this limit also removes 
the opportunity for many baby boomers to 
catch up and provide for their retirement, 
so rather than reducing this limit, as the 
Mercer report concluded: “Increasing these 
caps, particularly for those aged over 45, 
should be a priority for the government.”24 
In light of the international experience in 
this area, I suggest that the caps should be 
restored to at least $50,000, which should 
be indexed over time.
In conclusion, it must be remembered 
that the Henry Review concluded that 
superannuation’s sole purpose is to 
provide a lifetime savings vehicle and 
as such should receive preferential 
income tax treatment compared to 
other savings.25 Given the healthy and 
increasing rate of growth in tax revenues 
from superannuation, the government 
needs to be careful not to “kill the goose 
that lays the golden egg” by trying to 
squeeze even more tax revenue from the 
lemon that is already being squeezed very 
hard. It should therefore resist targeting 
superannuation — which is a long-term 
investment — as a convenient expedient to 
meet the government’s short-term needs to 
balance its books.
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